PREFACE
I have always believed that the most fundamental skill of any soldier in any Army must be skill at arms. Precision marksmanship is dependent solely on skills derived from constant practice under varying conditions. No matter the gender, race, creed, color, temperament, nor ethnic background makes one a skilled rifleman. For that matter the projectile and target don't care about those things. It is my sincere belief that if the Army as an institution gave more credence to skill at arms and worried less about social etiquette then we as an institution would be more deadly on the battlefield.
My thanks go to the following individuals for their knowledge and assistance in this project: Mr. Helmut Hein, LTC Michael Campbell, USAR; MSG Michael Carlin, USAR; LTC Gordon Davis, USA; and the students of AWC class 2002 who participated in my research survey. 
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THE WARRIOR CODE AND THE KINDER GENTLER ARMY
Army forces are the decisive component of land warfare in joint and multinational operations. The Army organizes, trains, and equips its forces to fight and win the nation's wars and achieve directed national objectives. Fighting and winning the nation's wars is the foundation of Army serv j C e-the Army's nonnegotiable contract with the American people and its enduring obligation to the nation.
Field Manual 3-0
PURPOSE.
Over the past few years there has been a great deal of talk and a fair amount of writing about what has happened to the Army culture. Has the Army become a collection of wimps?
Has social experimentation been taking place in the Army to the extent that it is now merely a testing ground for political correctness? Has a kinder, gentler breed of soldier supplanted the "warriors"? So much has the talk been traveling in undertones throughout the Army that for the past two years the Army Chief of Staff directed that the subject "The Warrior Code and the Kinder Gentler Army" be on his recommended list of research topics at the Army War College.
The chief function of the profession of arms is the application and management of organized, socially sanctioned force in pursuit of the nation's interests. Combat and success in battle are the profession's main concerns. Unique to the military profession is the willingness to sacrifice life and limb in the service of the state. The singular requirements of military professionalism shape an armed force's organizational culture. Culture refers to the nexus of attitudes, norms, values, customs, beliefs, and education that produce a group's collective sense of identity. Culture involves both ideas and behavior; it establishes the group's worldview as well as its normative behavior for responding to particular problems. In short, culture is the "glue" that consistently binds an organization together despite changes in leadership.
Warfighting, the military's core competency, defines its culture. That culture shapes the context of the professional soldiers' understanding of warfare in all of its manifold dimensions. The ethos of traditional military professional is embodied in the virtues of physical courage, selfdenial, self-sacrifice, obedience, and discipline. Its icons are those of the masculine warriorthe infantryman, paratrooper, or tank crewman, for example -who personifies the martial ethos. 1 There is clearly a culture problem within the ranks of the U. S. Army. If for no other reason than the Chief of Staff thinks there is. This paper will essay to accomplish two things.
First it will describe both the culture of "the warrior" and the "kinder gentler" culture. Right now both cultures exist in the Army and they clash with each other. Second it will espouse the premise that greater emphasis on marksmanship training and good shooting skills offers a viable means of transforming the Army culture to a culture which truly places combat readiness above any other considerations.
DEFINITIONS.
The preface to Army Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations states:
"Army forces are the decisive component of land warfare in joint and multinational operations. Army forces aggressively gain the initiative, build and maintain momentum, and exploit success to control the nature, scope, and tempo of full spectrum operations in war and military operations other than war. Execution of this doctrine requires well-trained soldiers and units fueled with the warrior ethos, the best weapons and equipment available, and the solid leadership of officers and noncommissioned officers of character and competence." 
The Warrior Code.
What makes a soldier a warrior? In A History of Warfare, noted British military historian John Keegan, tells us "The horse riding peoples, like the charioteers before them, brought to warmaking the electric concept of campaigning over long distances and, when campaigning resolved itself into battle, of maneuvering on the battlefield. As protectors of their flocks against predators, they also preserved the spirit of the hunter. The horse peoples fought to winquickly, completely, and quite unheroically." 4 A warrior then is a soldier who can rapidly close within effective firing range of the enemy and using the skills of stealth, perseverance, and well placed direct fire onto the enemy soldiers in order to quickly and completely render the enemy combat ineffective. This is important to note given the role and mission of the Army, to fight and win the nation's wars. The warrior figure transcends time and place. In one manifestation or another, the warrior has been an essential element in societies throughout history and on all parts of the globe. An essential servant, the true warrior did not fight out of love for aggression, but out of a caring for others. The purpose of the warrior was and is to protect others -his family, friends, fellow soldiers and nations. Selflessness is the ultimate source of the warrior's will and courage. The paradox for both society and the warrior himself is that uncontrolled, the aggressiveness and combativeness required of the warrior, both individually and collectively, is a threat not only to his enemies, but friends alike. A long-standing challenge for societies has been to channel, regulate, and direct the collective aggressiveness and force the warrior uses to protect society so that the same force did not destroy the society. To accomplish this need, warriors have usually been bound by a code of conduct, which in many nations is more accurately described as a way of life. 5 It is this way of life that many of the professionals of today's Army say is threatened by the kinder, gentler mind set.
Kinder, Gentler Army.
The term "kinder and gentler" has evolved since popularized by former president George H.W. Bush to describe a more compassionate America better focused on domestic and humanitarian needs. Today the term can be considered derisive in its description of a military impacted by the 1991 Tailhook and 1996 Aberdeen sexual misconduct scandals, sexual harassment charges leveled at senior officers and NCOs, and undisciplined incidents of horrific attacks based on racial prejudices and homophobia. "Kinder and gentler" has become virtually synonymous with "politically correct," a phrase describing ideas, expressions and behavior modified to preclude specific individuals or groups from being offended. 6 Stephanie Gutman, in her book "The Kinder, Gentler Military," asserts that the brass of the U. S. military "refused to *7 defend their own culture; they even began to systematically criminalize the warrior spirit."
CURRENT CORPORATE CLIMATE.
Army Culture identifies team effort to achieve success in battle; discipline, obedience, and loyalty to a hierarchical chain of command as the essential military virtues. In postmodernist culture all values are subject to interpretation, truth is relative, and relationships to institutions, especially governmental ones, are suspect. Postmodern models for behavior prize assertive individualism, portable loyalty, and self-actualization. Diversity and self-affirmation are the corner stones of the culture. The melting away of long-held societal taboos associated with gender and sexual orientation in postmodern society have affected the essence of military life. 
AS DESCRIBED IN THE HUMAN RELATIONS ACTION PLAN, HUMAN RELATIONS IS TREATING OTHERS WITH DIGNITY AND RESPECT, INCORPORATING THEIR INDIVIDUAL TALENTS TO THE SUCCESS OF A TEAM A SUCCESSFUL HUMAN RELATIONS CLIMATE IS ONE THAT (A) MAXIMIZES THE SOLDIERS AWARENESS OF HOW THEIR INDIVIDUAL ACTIONS AFFECT OTHERS, (B) EMPHASIZES RESPECT BETWEEN AND FOR SOLDIERS OF ALL RACES, CREEDS, GENDER, OR NATIONAL/ETHNIC HERITAGE, AND (C) ENABLES SOLDIERS TO CLEARLY UNDERSTAND THE LINKAGE BETWEEN THEIR ACTIONS TOWARD OTHERS AND THEIR UNITS ABILITY TO ACCOMPLISH THE MISSION. 3 THE "CONSIDERATION OF OTHERS" PROGRAM IS A SYSTEMIC PROGRAM DESIGNED TO CREATE, MAINTAIN AND ENFORCE AN ENVIRONMENT OF RESPECT AND DIGNITY THROUGHOUT THE ARMY, WHILE TAKING INTO ACCOUNT EACH COMMANDERS SPECIFIC TRAINING NEEDS.
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What this policy statement in essence does is mandate a set period of time that squad leaders must now use to teach social skills rather than soldier skills. A point of interest about the policy, paragraph three says the program is a systemic program, yet unit leaders are to tailor the program to their specific needs, so where is the system? This is akin to saying that all 
Misplaced Emphasis
In addition to placing a great deal of emphasis on socialization skills, the Army is also deemphasizing combat related skills, if not by commission then by omission. The Army Physical
Fitness Test (APFT) is illustrative of this. Every soldier in the Army is required to take the APFT twice per year (medical profiles not withstanding). That means that regardless of whether one is a wheeled-vehicle mechanic or a staff officer at the Pentagon, twice per year every soldier will lace up the running shoes and execute as many push-ups and sit-ups as possible in the allotted time and run two miles as quickly as possible. On the surface this seems to be not only right and fitting, but non-problematic. Except, on the battlefield performing sit-ups and running more than three to five seconds at a time is just not done (particularly in gym shorts and running shoes). By the same token, the mechanic from above is only required to fire his or her assigned weapon once per 12 month period and the Pentagon staff officer is not required nor even allowed to fire a weapon during the entire Pentagon tour. The purpose of this paper is not to argue the relative merits of physical fitness nor the means by which a suitable level of fitness is One must question this regulation. We train or should be training soldiers to use weapons systems that are capable of three-round bursts, as well as fully automatic weapons, handgrenades and a plethora of other tools of controlled violence. Yet we don't trust our soldiers to be able to safely handle single shot, bolt action, or semi-automatic weapons that any 18-year old citizen of this country with no felony convictions has the legal right to purchase?
Since one is not supposed to be able to enlist if one has a felony conviction and since a golf club is equally capable of a deadly wound in a crime of passion, the prohibition on having a sporting rifle or shotgun in the barracks doesn't make much sense. That in and of it-self is somewhat telling about the kinder, gentler more politically correct Army we have evolved into. Guard (and eventually the rest of the National Guard across the country). Wingate also wrote a marksman's manual, which the U. S. Navy quickly adopted. The NRA also presided over the major sporting activity of international match shooting which became spectacularly popular after Despite this petitioning for training ammunition a large segment of the professional officer corps fought the concept of proficient individual marksmen. These "conservative" officers felt that an emphasis on individual proficiency and the ability for the marksman to pick and shoot his own targets would lead to a breakdown in discipline as well as over expenditure of ammunition.
The conservatives preferred to rely on the German Army system of field firing wherein the officers estimated the range to target and the soldiers would fire at the direction of the officers
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(though not in volley). They also believed that artillery fire was the wave of the future.
Despite the objections of the conservative officers, the Army's excitement over target practice grew rapidly in the 1880s. General Philip Sheridan, who had a personal interest in shooting, intensified the training by adding distance firing to 1000 yards and adding skirmishing. "The last war proved that if you hit a German in the right place with a caliber .30 rifle bullet, he falls over dead. This is also true in this war. It applies, moreover, to Japs as well as Nazis.
The U.S. Army Rifle -be it the M1903 (Springfield), M1917 (Enfield), or M1 (Garand)-has the range, caliber, power, and accuracy to kill Nazis and Japs. All that is required is a soldier well enough trained in rifle marksmanship to hit the enemy in the right places.
The U.S. Army believes in this training. Its rifle marksmanship course is the most thorough in the world.
Deadly marksmanship depends on correct shooting habits. In stress of battle, you must do the right things without thinking about them. You must know the correct sight picture. You must take a rock-steady position. You must squeeze the trigger. You must shoot rapidly. And all the while your sights must be set for range, wind, and weather".
All of that is taken just from the foreword of the manual. Next we find "Today's bull's-eye will be a well-armed Jap or Nazi tomorrow. You hit him. Or you miss. For that reason, there's no such thing as shooting that is just about (Italics original) right. It is either perfect-or it is wrong. Your life depends upon it. By learning right shooting habits-by constant practice-every man can learn to shoot". 25 The manual then has an epigraph, which recounts the exploits of We consider the infantry as starting somewhere around 300 yards out and continuing on all the way to -and beyond -the objective itself, but for the rifleman, 300 yard shots will clearly be the exception rather than the rule, with the majority of his engagements being at 100 yards or less.
To be sure, we need to train for the longer range opportunities, but every soldier must be able to hit those targets that appear unexpectedly and close in. This is particularly true for combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units. Maneuver units in contact with the enemy are totally dependent on their logistical support in terms of services and virtually all classes of supply, and these CS and CSS units' survivability is essential. Our potential adversaries have long regarded our support base as an easy target, and we must train The devices do provide feedback to the shooter on round placement. While simulations are not the same as live firing, any system that allows the soldier to handle his assigned weapon and receive immediate feedback will improve the combat effectiveness of our soldiers.
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SIMULATION DEVICES
Currently there are three simulation devices in the Army inventory that could be put to much better use if the emphasis were placed on them. All three incorporate the use of blank ammunition while two of the three can be used on M16A1/2 or M4 carbine weapons. (This is essential because the idea is not just to make the soldier a better marksman, but to understand the idiosyncrasies of his or her assigned weapon.) What follows is a brief description of the three simulation devices that should be put to use in today's Army
Engagement Skills Trainer (EST).
The EST can accommodate 12 soldiers at a time. Thus it can provide both individual rifle marksmanship and some squad level collective training. The EST uses a combination of analog and digital video, synchronized image projection, laser-hit detection, and microcomputer technology to display a variety of target arrays and courses of fire on an 8 ft. x 30 ft. wide 37 screen.
Laser Marksmanship Training System (LMTS).
The major components of the LMTS are a laser transmitter, a mandrel to which the 
Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System (MILES).
The MILES simulation equipment allows for force on force exercises that provide immediate feedback on not only marksmanship skills, but battlefield survivability as well. What has marksmanship to do with the current clash of cultures in the Army? I believe that with renewed emphasis on marksmanship training, the current culture issues will fade away. By spending more energy on training marksmanship skills and spending less time on social norming, the culture gap will be reduced to insignificance. By going to various ranges (qualification, live fire maneuver, etc.) more often and employing weapons as they were intended would net the following results: soldiers would become confident in their basic soldierskills; they would become better trained in battlefield survival; and the image of the "kinder,
gentler Army" would be diminished. This last would be a fait accompli, but undeniable. If a female transportation specialist routinely fires expert with her weapon, very few soldiers who consider themselves "warriors" could convince an audience that this female soldier had denigrated the Army's ability to destroy the enemy. With the exceptions of line infantry and armor battalions the amount of emphasis and application weapons system training could be considered negligent. The analogy has been made that "if Americans learned how to ride a bicycle the way the Army conducts weapons training, we would still be walking. 'Consider that most bicycle riders begin the riding process at around the ages of 3-4. They start on a tricycle and everyday after kindergarten they are out in the driveway learning to pedal. After a period of time they graduate to a bike with two training wheels. Again, everyday after school, they are on the bike learning balance and coordination. More time passes and they graduate to a bike with no training wheels. But once the training wheels come off, they aren't considered proficient.
They still come home everyday after school and practice, practice, practice, with a parent or older sibling trotting beside, catching them as they fall and whispering words of advice and offering praise for every advance. Only after continued repetition and a number of years does the bicycle rider reach the stage at which literally years can pass before bestriding a bike and successfully riding on the first attempt. The Army doesn't do that with weapons. Instead we take our trainees out for roughly two weeks during basic training and teach them the tricycle part. Then they go to their units and for the most part for the rest of their time in the Army they stay at the two-training wheel level because that is the most you can get out of two times a year at a zero/qualification range." 39 To add to the analogy, shooting like bike riding is fun. Soldiers like to do things like fire their weapons. It is one of those things somewhat unique to military service that shooting is part of it. The soldiers like to pit their skills against their friends in competition. They also get to know one another better. Training together on an event and in an environment so different from the rest of the society builds bonds found nowhere else. It is this kind of bonding and honing of skills that creates a healthy culture and well trained Army.
On the battlefield what matters most is whether or not the soldiers to your left and right can hit what they are shooting at. APFT scores, skin color, and MOSs become irrelevant. I think that by emphasizing our common interests (such as staying alive, accomplishing the mission and defeating the enemy) rather than making it easy to assume a "victim" mentality the Army culture will change. The change would be seen across the spectrum of the Army as truly an Army of one or, rather, one Army of skilled deadly marksmen.
RECOMMENDATIONS.
I recommend the following considerations for change. First, I recommend that the Army completely re-evaluate the allocation of ammunition for category II soldiers of all TRCs.
Going to the qualification range once per year does not make anyone an accomplished marksman. This is nothing more than weapons familiarity not weapons effectiveness. Rifle marksmanship takes as long to learn as learning to playing the violin. The learning curve comes up quickly in the equipment familiarity phase, and then it flattens out considerably during the lengthy and seemingly endless trudge to the far end. As the activities of practice are done (shooting, dry firing, etc.), all participants slowly move along the learning curve. If practice continues long enough, all leave equipment familiarity behind and move far out to form an elongated curve at the far end of the learning curve. 40 The bottom line is that if soldiers are to become anything other than just familiar with their individual weapons they need to fire them more than once a year.
Second, I believe that all officers should wear their individual marksmanship qualification badges when in class A, B or dress uniforms. The requirement already exists in AR 670-1, which states "At least one marksmanship badge will normally be worn by all personnel except for those exempt by Army Regulations." 41 Based purely on anecdotal evidence most officers do not currently wear marksmanship badges they are entitled to wear. I believe that this will visibly help shape the Army culture by:
1. The officer corps would put more effort into personal performance at the range, as well as making sure that the paperwork on the desk wasn't more important than going out to the range with the soldiers.
2. The junior enlisted soldiers would not only see hands on leadership at a critical skill, but also be have a visible goal to strive for in an even competition.
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3. With all officers wearing the marksmanship qualification badges the Army would have a visible reminder that skill at arms is a very high priority.
Finally, I believe that by changing the regulations to allow soldiers 18 years old or older to keep rifles or shotguns in their rooms the Army would benefit in two ways:
1. We would reaffirm our trust in the soldier. We currently have 18-20 year old men and women who in the course of their jobs we trust to drive heavy equipment, carry and fire automatic weapons and handle explosives. These same men and women should be trusted to keep and safely maintain firearms that they are entitled by federal law and the U.S. Constitution to own. By changing the regulation we simply reaffirm our trust in them as the next generation of leaders.
2. As soldiers have more exposure to firearms and the various shooting sports disciplines, they can apply the general store of marksmanship lessons learned to their military shooting.
In conclusion, by implementing these few suggested changes, I think that the Army could be on the path to end the current clash of cultures in the Army. They are not a panacea nor are they intended to be. Good shooting skills will not make soldiers better at their MOSs, nor will marksmanship training endow all soldiers with the Army values. But by emphasizing marksmanship and training on marksmanship skills, soldiers will be continually reminded what business they are ultimately in, they will learn to respect each other for the common skills they share, and they will be reminded about their unique place in American society. The ongoing transformation process is a good place to put this tool in place to assist in unifying and confirming the zero of the Army culture.
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